but can also espouse the collectivist values of Aboriginal communities. It is possible to reconcile human rights law with Aboriginal values, but only insofar as Aboriginal peoples implement it on their own terms and within their own institutional frameworks.
Eliadis acknowledges that Aboriginal rights present significant challenges to Canada's rights culture but underestimates the seriousness of these criticisms. The failure of human rights law to respond to Aboriginal peoples' concerns undermines the legitimacy of those laws. Rights law, when integrated into the framework of the state, can only be as effective at protecting citizens as the state allows it to be. In Canada, law is an extension of the colonial state, and human rights law reproduces its colonial logic. The Canadian government has historically used human rights law to deprive Aboriginal peoples of their rights, for example by preventing people living or working on reserves from filing human rights complaints relating to the Indian Act. Aboriginal peoples living in Canada are particularly reluctant to call upon human rights law to settle grievances. Many view it as ineffective and at odds with the values of their communities or fear that the community will exclude them if they make a claim against the local government. The distrust of human rights law reflects a deeper mistrust of a colonial state that has functioned to marginalise Aboriginal peoples for centuries. Human rights law will not protect those who the state itself has historically failed to protect and continues to actively marginalise.
Jason Chalmers University of Alberta chalmers@ualberta.ca
